Showing posts with label Torts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Torts. Show all posts

Thursday, August 6, 2009

Claim for negligence

Negligence is a tort with four elements:
  1. a duty of reasonable care
  2. breach of that duty
  3. causation
  4. resulting damages
Plaintiff must prove all four of these elements to recover on a claim for negligence

Note: Courts also use negligence to stand for a failure to live up to the standard of care (element #2); to say that a def. is negligent can mean he/she failed to exercise reasonable care

Students often confuse the two - DON'T BE THAT STUDENT! - a tort of negligence needs the four elements and the concept of negligence has to do with the breach of the standard of due care. So, a person can be negligent without satisfying the requirements for a claim of negligence (for example, if no damages are a result of the breach)

Thursday, September 18, 2008

Haver v. Hinson (a.k.a. runover kid)

Haver v. Hinson
385 So.2d 605 (Miss. 1980).

Justice ___ delivered opinion

Facts:
  • Def. drove car to Havers' house
  • Def. pulled over and parked on left side of street, immediately in front of Plain.'s residence
  • Plain. came out with child (Elizabeth) to speak to def.
  • Few minutes later, def. started to drive away, heard thud, stopped car, and found child underneath, lodged by exhaust pipe and seriously injured
  • Plain. sues, alleging def. negligent per se in driving and parking on wrong side of the street, violating Mississippi Code Annotated section 63-3-601 (1972)
Issue:
Was the defendant negligent per se in parking and driving on the wrong side of the street?

Holding: No.

Reasoning:
  • Statute constitutes negligent per se only where (1) the plaintiff is a member of the class sought to be protected by the statute, and (2) the resultant harm is of the type sought to be presented by the passage of the statute
Court says:
  • Clear class sought to be protected only includes pedestrians and drivers who act in reliance of the orderly flow of traffic dictated by the statute
  • Risk of accident just as likely had def. driven and parked facing the "appropriate" direction

Tuesday, September 16, 2008

Robinson v. Lindsay (a.k.a. dude, where's my thumb)

Robinson v. Lindsay
92 Wash.2d 410, 598 P.2d 392 (1979).

Chief Justice Utter delivered opinion

Facts:
  • Kelly Robinson lost full use of a thumb in a snowmobile accident when she was 11 years old
  • Billy Anderson was driving the snowmobile at the time of the accident
  • He was 13 at the time of the accident
  • Jury verdict in favor of the defendant
  • Trial court ordered new trial because trial ct failed to instruct jury as to the standard of care
  • Appeals court agreed w/ tr. ct. and ordered new trial
  • Plain. excepted to giving of instruction that compared Anderson's act to that of a child of the same age, intelligence, maturity, etc to determine reasonableness (WPI 10.05)
  • arguing jury should have heard s.o.c. instructions for adults
Issue:
Can a minor operating a snowmobile be held to an adult standard of care?

Holding: Yes, when child is operating a powerful motorized vehicle, he/she should be held to an adult s.o.c.

Reasoning:
  • When the activity a child engages in is inherently dangerous, as is the operation of powerful mechanized vehicles, the child should be held to an adult s.o.c.
  • protects children
  • discourages immature individuals from engaging in inherently dangerous activities
  • Children can enjoy childhood activities w/o being subjected to adult s.o.c. in the event an injury occurs as a result of such activities
  • Ct agrees w/ Minn. Sup. Ct.'s language "we should be skeptical of a rule that would allow motor vehicles to be operated to the hazard of the public with less than the normal minimum degree of care and competence"
  • Minn. court cited cases in which minor had been operating tractor, motorcycle, minibike, and an automobile
  • Operation of a snowmobile requires adult care
  • stats show incidence of accidents w/ snowmobiles is particularly high among inexperienced drivers
  • Boy was operating a powerful motor vehicle at time of accident
Judgment: Affirmed (order for new trial by lower trial court)

Wilson v. Sibert (a.k.a. back that car up)

Wilson v. Sibert
535 P.2d 1034 (Alaska 1975).

Chief Justice Rabinowitz delivered opinion

Facts:
  • Appellee Sibert was stopped in vehicle in line at bank window in Anchorage, appellant Mary Wilson was behind him.
  • Car in front of Sibert unexpectedly starting back up
  • Sibert throws car into reverse and backs into Wilson's car
  • fender goes into wheel, rendering car immobile
  • Appellee Sibert did not use his horn or look behind him before backing up, only became aware of car there when he hit it
Issue:
Did the trial court err in 1. denying motions for directed verdict on issue of liability and did they further err in 2. giving a sudden emergency instruction to the jury?

Holding: No.

Reasoning:
Wilson claims "total absence" of care shows Sibert didn't exercise care toward her and that jury couldn't find otherwise

Court says:
  • Issue 1: Appellant's position doesn't take into account the speed at which a person in an emergency may act
  • Law requires same negligence test in emergency situations (i.e., the standard of conduct of a reasonable person under the same circumstances)
  • In an emergency conduct that may otherwise be unreasonable becomes reasonable
  • that appellee failed to show normal care is proof of the emergency situation, he had an "apparent need to act almost instantaneously"
  • Issue 2: Looking at other court decisions, ct determines it is predominantly accepted that it is not prejudicial error for trial ct to give "superfluous" sudden emergency instructions
  • No evidence that giving the emergency instructions impropertly influenced the jury
Judgment: Affirmed

Monday, September 15, 2008

Stewart v. Motts (a.k.a. gasoline stan. of care)

Stewart v. Motts
539 Pa. 596, 654 A.2d 535 (1995).

Justice Montemuro delivered opinion

Facts:
  • July 15, 1987, plain. Stewart stopped at def.'s shop and offered assist. to repair an auto fuel tank
  • Plain. suggested and poured gasoline into the carburetor
  • Def was to turn the key in the ignition when specified
  • Car backfired, there was an explosion, and Plain severely burned on upper body
  • Plain. asked judge to instruct jury gasoline reqr'd "high degree of care"
  • Judge didn't and jury ruled in favor of def.
Issue:
Whether there exists a higher standard of "extraordinary care" for the use of dangerous instrumentalities over and above the standard of "reasonable care" such that the trial court erred for failing to give an instruction to the jury that the Appellee should have used a "high degree of care" in handling gasoline?

Holding: No. There is only one standard of care and that standard is "reasonable care".

Reasoning:
  • Is only one standard of care and it is reasonable care (restatement (second) of torts)
  • Standard doesn't vary, but care that is reasonable to require of actor varies w/ danger involved in act and is proportionate to it
  • greater the danger, greater the care to be exercised
  • Konchar v. Cebular reaffirmed general principle that care employed by reasonable man must be proportionate to danger of activity
  • References to "higher standard of care" did not create second tier of "extraordinary care" over and above reasonable care
  • level of care is in proportion to danger involved in his act
  • Commonwealth only recognizes one s.o.c. in negligence actions involving dangerous instruments
  • Looked at jury instructions
  • judge properly instructed jury
  • found nothing misleading, confusing or unclear in judge's instructions
  • Jury had tools to examine case and determine if def. was reqr'd to use a "higher degree of care"
Judgment: Affirmed

Rule: Only one standard of care and that is reasonable care; under said standard, level of care must be proportionate to the danger involved

Friday, September 12, 2008

Prosser v. Keeton (a.k.a. Hey, that's my watch!)

Prosser v. Keeton
143 Unrep. Case 1113.

Justice Allen delivered opinion

Facts:
  • Prosser was owner of a valuable watch
  • Watch was stolen by an unknown person (later discovered to be Thurlow)
  • Thurlow sold stolen watch to Keeton
    • Thurlow told Keeton needed to sell watch to raise money for ill mother
  • Keeton and Thurlow attended the same church
    • Keeton reasonably believed Thurlow was owner and paid Thurlow for watch
  • Thurlow disappears
  • Prosser sees Keeton wearing watch about a month later
  • Prosser able to identify watch by secret mark on back
  • Prosser demanded return, Keeton declines advising pd money and would not return it
  • Trial ct orders Keeton to return watch or pay its reasonable value
Issue:
Does a person who acquired an item that turns out to be stolen have to return it or give the original owner the value of the item?

Holding:
No, the person does not have to return the item or pay the value of the item to the original owner.

Reasoning:
Judge Bateman
  • Since neither party is guilty of wrongdoing, Keeton keeps the watch
  • Prosser was in a better position to prevent the loss
Justice Compton
  • Making buyer liable for purchases would stop capitalism
  • Social policy requires Keeton to keep the watch
  • No evidence that Prosser was better able to prevent theft than Keeton was able to detect watch was stolen
Judgment: Affirmed

Opinions:
Justice Allen dissented
  • thief did not have title to watch so therefore was unable to transfer it
  • Keeton is liable because he converted the watch

Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. (a.k.a. damaged dock)

Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910)

Justice O'Brien delivered opinion

Facts:
  • Def.'s steamship, Reynolds, was moored to plain's dock in Duluth to unload cargo on Nov. 27, 1905
  • Storm hit with winds at 50 mph
  • Navigation in waters suspended from approx. 10pm until morning
  • Once unloading was completed, Reynolds unable to get tugboat to take off dock bec. of storm
  • Lines held steamship to dock, and dock damaged as a result of steamship slamming into it repeatedly
  • damage amounted to $500
Issue:
Is a boat moored to a dock during a storm liable for its damages to the dock?

Holding: Yes. The defendant is liable.

Reasoning:
Note: Ct. states only question for jury was the amount of damages which plaintiffs were entitled to recover, but no complaint was made on that score

Court says:
  • Def. chose to keep boat attached to dock to preserve ship at expense of the dock
  • Def. are responsible to pay plain. for injury done to dock
  • Ploof v. Putnam - if boat had remained attached and dock destroyed, most likely boat owner would have had to pay damages
  • Not a case where life or prop. was menaced by object of thing belonging to plain. that the destruction of would been necessary to prevent a disaster
  • Def. prudently availed itself of plain's prop. for the purpose of preserving its own more valuable prop.
  • Plain is entitled to compensation for damages done

Judgment: Affirmed

Opinions:
Justice Lewis dissented
  • If boat lawfully in position at time storm hit and master could not move it w/o sustaining damaging vessel, any harm done to dock was by accident
  • Def. had permission to dock to unload by plain., which entered them into contract
  • plain enters into such contract assuming risk of damage to dock if boat moored gets caught in storm
Rule: While ordinary rules of property are suspended by forces beyond human control, in this case, the defendants purposefully attached to the dock, knowing it was likely to cause damage. Def. may use dock in such instances but must pay for the privilege with reasonable compensation.

Surocco v. Geary (a.k.a. the house is on fire)

Surocco v. Geary
3 Cal. 69 (1953).

Chief Justice Murray delivered opinion

Facts:
  • Geary, the Alcade (mayor) of San Fran., had authority to burn down plain.'s bldg to stop fire from spreading
  • Fire passed over and burned beyond plain's bldg
  • Plain. was in process of remving items from bldg at time it was dstryd
  • Plain. argues could have remvd most/all items if given more time
Issue:
Can a person who, under apparent necessity, burns down/destroys an individual's house during time of conflagration to save adjacent buildings and stop fire's progress, be held personally liable for damages to owner of property purposefully destroyed?

Holding: No, value life over property.

Reasoning:
  • Right to destroy prop. to prevent conflag. is traced to highest law of necessity
  • Individual rights of prop. give way to higher laws of impending necessity
  • Private rights of individual yield to considerations of general convenience and interests of society
  • Who is to judge necessity?
    • necessity of blowing up house might not be apparent to homeowner who has personal interest
  • Difficulty in determining necessity is not obviated by making parties responsible in every case, whether necessity existed or not
  • Bec. of absence of any legislation, ct falls back on common law
    • facts clearly establshed
    • blowing up house was necessary
Judgment: Reversed

Opinions: N/A

Thoughts: Public necessity case. Not arguing against principle but how it was applied. Plain. argues ok to blow up house but let me get my stuff!

Rule: The common law says that when it is necessary to give up one house in the interests of the society (public necessity) the person whose house was sacrificed can't sue.

Ploof v. Putnam (a.k.a. Protecting Ploof's sloop)

Ploof v. Putnam
81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908).

Facts:
  • Def. owned island in Lake Champlain
  • Plain. w/ wife and 2 kids, were sailing a sloop on the lake when storm hit
  • Plain. moored boat on def.'s dock to avoid destruction of boat and protect family from injury
  • Def. had servant unmoor boat
  • Sloop was destroyed and people on board were injured
  • Plain. argued act of unmooring boat was a trespass to it and that def. had duty to permit sloop to remain attached to dock

Issue:
Does unmooring a boat from a dock, which is moored there to protect boat and avoid injury to members on board boat during a storm, constitute a trespass?

Holding: Yes, value life over property.

Reasoning:
  • "There are many cases...which hold that necessity...will justify entries upon land and interferences with personal property that would otherwise have been trespasses..."
  • Entry upon land to save goods in danger of being lost/destryd by water/fire is not a trespass
Judgment: Held for plaintiff

Opinions: N/A

Thoughts: privilege of private necessity

Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co. (a.k.a. tear gas house)

Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co.
479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991)

Justice Tomljanovich delivered opinion

Facts:
  • Minn. police staking out house to apprehend two suspected felons believed to be coming to sell narcotics
  • Before arrest could be made suspects fled in car, which abandoned to escape on foot after a high speed chase
  • One suspect entered house of Harriet G. Wegner and hid in her front closet
  • Wegner fled house and called police
  • Police arrive to surround house and called for an "Operation 100"
    • Op. 100 = calling the ERU (Emer. Res. Unit - read: SWAT team)
  • Tried to make contact w/ suspect inside home via bullhorn and telephone
  • When that wasn't successful, police shot at least 25 rounds of tear gas into house, breaking virtually every window in house in process
  • Also threw in 3 "flash-bang" grenades to confuse suspect
  • Eventually suspect caught trying to escape through basement window
Issue:
Does the city's admittedly legitimate police power result in a "taking" as defined in Article I, section 13, of the Minn. Constitution?

Note: Minn. Cons. section reads as follows: "Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without compensation, first paid or secured." (Purpose of clause is to ensure private landowners are compensated not only for physical invasion of their property but also damages caused by the state where no physical invasion has occurred.)

Holding: No, not fair to allocate the entire risk of loss to an innocent homeowner for the good of the public.

Reasoning:
  • City contends there was no taking for public use because police used legitimate power
    • police power is indefinable
  • Simply labeling actions of police as an exercise in power doesn't justify disregard constitutional inhibitions
  • Minn. Sup. Ct. looked at "plain meaning" of article
Court says:
  • Constitution itself is auth for compensation for des. of prop. and is a waiver of govt. immunity
  • Clear police intentionally fired tear gas and grenades into house
  • Resulting damage by police in course of apprehending suspect was for a public use w/in meaning of Const.
  • Restatement (Second) of Torts section 196 describes doctrine as follows: "One is privileged to enter land in the possession of another if it is, or if the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting an imminent public disaster..."
  • Ct. not inclined to allow the city to defend its actions on the grounds of public necessity
  • Better rule is for municipality to compensate innocent party for resulting damages using the basic notion of fairness and justice
  • City must reimburse Wegner for losses sustained
    • individual officers were acting in public interest, cannot be held individ. liable
    • cost of damages should be paid by citizens of city

Judgment: Reversed and remanded for trial on issue of damages

Opinions: N/A

Thoughts: Court of Appeals rvwd McCoy v. Sanders, GA case when "taking" was limited to physical interference; Minn. Sup. Ct. stated never held that Minn. Const. art. I, section 13 is to be applied in this manner.

Thursday, September 11, 2008

Brown v. Martinez (a.k.a. watermelon thief)

Brown v. Martinez
68 N.M. 271, 361 P.2d 152 (1961).

Chief Justice Moise delivered opinion

Facts:
  • Sept. 18, 1954, 15-yr old boy and 2 others went to steal watermelons from def.'s property
  • Next evening (Sept. 19, 1954), 15-yr old boy returned w/ several boys to steal melons
  • 2 boys enter melon patch; appellant goes to SE corner near hwy
  • Appellee hears boys, comes out w/ rifle, calls out, and shoots opposite direction of where boys were running (they were heading SW) to try and scare them
  • Appellee accidentally shoots boy standing in SE corner of property by fence (no intent)
Issue:
Is it reasonable to use a firearm to prevent trespass?

Holding: No, value life over property.

Reasoning:
  • law marked out limitations on using force in self-defense
    • life valued more than property
    • "no privilege to use any force calculated to cause death or serious bodily injury where only property is threatened"
  • no proof appellee felt safety was threatened
  • appellee acted improperly and is liable for using gun in manner he did
Judgment: Reversed and remanded

Opinions: N/A

Thoughts: Transferred intent case; facts described do not equal battery. Court wanted to make clear its stance on folks shooting firearms to protect property (possible had no one been shot court might have decided differently)